



# Asia-Pacific Counter-IED Fusion Center

## Monthly IED Activity Report



DOI: 31 October 2017

### About the APCFC

The Asia-Pacific C-IED Fusion Center is the premier center for irregular warfare analysis in the U.S. Pacific Command. The center develops and synchronizes C-IED and EOD programs and regional engagements. The center resources USARAPC C-IED training to ensure U.S., Allied, and Partner Nations survivability.



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
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
**Executive Summary:** In October, there was a 38% decrease in IED activity across the Asia-Pacific, as well as a 63% decrease in IED-related casualties compared to last month. In South Asia, there was a 35% decrease in IED events and a 48% decrease in IED-related casualties. In Southeast Asia, IED events decreased by 43% while IED-related casualty rates dropped by 70%. There were no reported IED events in North-east Asia this month.

There were **60** IED events in the Asia-Pacific region in October 2017




Icons depict events for October 2017; heat map depicts event density from October 2016 - October 2017

October IED events




■ Detonation
 ■ Hoax
 ■ Found/Cleared
 ■ Cache

October IED events by Country



October IED Casualties




■ CIV KIA
 ■ HN KIA
 ■ CIV WIA
 ■ HN WIA

Click on an entry to advance to the associated page.

**This document is limited to those personnel performing military, intelligence, law enforcement, or security duties in support of C-IED operations.**

# October Asia-Pacific IED Events by Region




## Executive Summary (Continued)

In South Asia, IED activity decreased from 60 events in September to 39 events in October. IED-related casualties also decreased from 21 casualties last month to 11 casualties this month. In Bangladesh, IED events remained low with five total incidents, and there were no reported IED-related casualties in October. Despite this lull, a 9 OCT raid on a Neo-Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (Neo-JMB) safe house resulted in the recovery of several PBIEDs ([see pg. 9](#)). In India, there was a marginal decrease in both IED activity and IED-related casualties ([see pg. 10](#)). In Nepal, there were no reported IED events in October, representing a significant drop in IED activity from last month. This drop in events was due to the completion of local elections and a decrease in politically motivated attacks.

In Southeast Asia, IED activity decreased from 37 events in September to 21 events in October. IED-related casualties also decreased from 47 casualties last month to 14 casualties this month. In the Philippines, IED activity decreased by 19%; IED-related casualties, however, were three times higher in October than September ([see pg. 12](#)). In Thailand, there was a 50% drop in IED events from September, and also a substantial drop in IED-related casualties ([see pg. 13](#)). In Burma, IED events decreased sharply for the third straight month, following the suspension of military operations in Rakhine state ([see pg. 14](#)). In Malaysia, a 10 OCT IED cache recovery by police likely prevented the execution of several planned IED attacks across Kuala Lumpur ([see pg. 15](#)).


*IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from OPEN SOURCES are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations. Event refers to specific IED activity categories: IED Detonation, IED Found/Cleared, IED Hoax, IED Cache.*

# PACOM IED Events - Past 12 Months



Icons depict events from September 2016 to September 2017; occasional overlap occurs

### Past Year IED Event Casualty Count




South Asia sees the highest level of IED events in the region, primarily due to India's high activity. IED activity across the region is often centered around periods of political unrest or contested elections. Devices thrown or emplaced during those outbreaks of violence vary widely in complexity (e.g. basic, command-wire to radio-controlled) and lethality.


Southeast Asia sees approximately half the activity of South Asia, with the Philippines and Thailand as the primary contributors to the number of events. While Thailand's IED activity is primarily attributable to Muslim-Malay insurgents in the south, the Philippines faces communist, jihadist, and Moro separatist threats. By comparison, attacks in Indonesia and Malaysia are far less frequent.

Northeast Asia sees relatively few IED attacks and they can often be attributed to an individual's act of protest against an employer, the government, or retaliation against an acquaintance. Disaffected groups, such as the Uyghurs in China, occasionally incorporate IEDs in their attacks. Press reporting from the region is limited and generally unreliable, therefore actual events are likely higher than shown here.

### Past Year IED events




### Past Year IED events by Country






# IED Activity - Past 12 Months

## Switch Type



## Group Affiliation




IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics are presumed to be approximations. Graphics represent known switch type and group affiliation.

## Incident Highlight: Foiled ISIS plot in Malaysia

On 10 OCT, the Royal Malaysian Police (RMP) arrested three suspected ISIS militants in Kelantan under suspicion of plotting an attack against various locations in the Klang Valley, including Kuala Lumpur's Better Beer Festival, entertainment outlets, and non-Muslim religious sites. Following the arrests, the RMP recovered a cache with three 800g pipe bombs containing ball bearings, one 600g pipe bomb, IED components, and firecrackers. Additionally, investigators found a drawing detailing production methods for a larger IED. The RMP later revealed that the suspects detonated another IED as a test in September.

The RMP identified the suspects as 19-year old student Muhammad Hafizi Mat Jusoh; 24-year old construction contractor Ahmad Azmi Ahmad Rosli; and 34-year old former soldier Mahadi Ibrahim. Authorities believe Jusoh was self-radicalized and learned how to construct IEDs online (he is responsible for the production drawing). Rosli allegedly had ties with Muhammad Wannady Mohamad Jedi, the Malaysian ISIS recruiter in Syria who was killed in April. According to the RMP, Ibrahim served as the cell's financier. Both Rosli and Ibrahim also had ties with the Gagak Hitam (Black Crows) gang, which was the group implicated in the detonation of a grenade in a nightclub in 2016.

Jusoh's drawing, described as highly detailed by the RMP, appears to show a five-part process in which black powder from five firecrackers is removed from the casings, processed, and then combined with enhancements (probably ball bearings) in a bottle or a pipe. It is then wrapped with smaller pipe bombs and appears to be initiated with a time fuse. The pipe bombs recovered in the cache may have been prototypes or possibly components of a larger device.



Recovered drawing of IED production method

Though this plot was disrupted, it appears that there is an upward trend in Malaysia towards radicalization and acceptance of ISIS ideology by individuals concerned that foreign influence may lead to vice and the downfall of Islamic values. Malaysian counter-terrorism authorities have not only been combating internal extremism, but have also been coordinating with foreign governments to disrupt plots and activity. According to a report released by the RMP, 78 individuals have been detained for extremism between January and October 2017. Forty-five of those detained were foreign extremists, which were subsequently deported. Of the foreign militants, most were Southeast Asians with ties to extremist groups in Indonesia and the Philippines, but there were also South Asians and others. The RMP has also encouraged vigilance regarding the return of Malaysian fighters from Syria, Iraq, and Marawi, Philippines.

Sources: Sources: TNP (10/14/17) BenarNews (10/17/17) Bharian (10/17/17) Star (10/19/17) BenarNews (11/5/17) Straits Times (11/6/17) Star (11/6/17)

## Special Assessment: The Post-Marawi State of ISIS-Philippines

The siege of Marawi, initiated by the compilation of groups that compose ISIS-Philippines (ISIS-PHL), is officially over. On 23 OCT, following 154 days of intense urban combat that killed 165 Philippine troops and a reported 920 Islamist terrorists, Delfin Lorenzana, Defense Secretary of the Philippines, announced the end of combat operations in Marawi.

The siege of Marawi is arguably the most ambitious plot launched by Philippine jihadists in decades. The pursuit of establishing an Islamic caliphate in the Philippines through the seizure and holding of territory resulted in the loss of most of the group's senior and mid-level leadership, leaving ISIS-PHL absent ideological or operational direction. Secretary Lorenzana made the announcement days after the reported deaths of ISIS-PHL leaders Isnilon Hapilon, Omar Maute, and Dr. Mahmud Ahmad. The loss of leadership coupled with the length and intensity of combat operations has likely resulted in a significant degradation of ISIS-PHL's operational capabilities; however, the group still presents a threat to Philippine and regional security.



ISIS-P leaders highlighted in *Rumiyah* 10

In the aftermath of such a substantial defeat, the future direction and composition of ISIS-PHL remains indeterminate. Following the death of Dr. Mahmud Ahmad on 19 OCT, reports from an early November arrest of an Indonesian fighter in Marawi claimed that a Malaysian, Amin Baco, had assumed leadership of ISIS-PHL. The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), however, believes Baco died during the AFP clearance of the city. Moreover, if he is still alive, the AFP maintains that he is only a mid-level leader and does not possess the kind of credibility necessary to create a substantial following necessary to rebuild ISIS-PHL. Indeed, Baco's claims to leadership are questionable, as he was not chosen by peers and formally recognized by ISIS leadership: both conditions that contributed to the appointment of Hapilon. As such, it is doubtful that Baco will remain in command of the organization, if he is in fact alive and survives continued AFP security operations in Marawi.



The seven Maute Brothers: Mohammad Khayam, Omar, Abdullah, Abdulrahman, Abdul Azis, Hamza, possibly Mahater (Hashim)

Potential replacements for ISIS-PHL leadership includes Esmael Abdulmalik/Abdulmaguid (alias Abu Toraife/Toraype/Turaipe), who has been active in recent months. Abdulmalik leads the ISIS-aligned faction of the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) known as Jamaatul Mujahideen Wal Ansar (JMWA) that splintered from the other ISIS-aligned BIFF faction led by Esmael Abubakar Hassan (alias Commander Bungos) in October 2016. He is reportedly an influential cleric, skilled bombmaker, and known to be a student of the late Malaysian IED trainer, Zuklifi bin Hir (Marwan). From June to October 2017, Abdulmalik

attempted to open a second front to Marawi in Maguindanao, by raising ISIS flags in Islamic communities and conducting harassment attacks against Philippine security forces. His actions prompted the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) to align temporarily in an attempt to dislodge the JMWA from what the MILF considers their designated peace zones. Although the combined forces of the AFP and the MILF have been able to keep JWMA contained, Abdulmalik's group remains one of the most active remnants of ISIS-PHL.

Another potential ISIS-PHL leadership candidate is Humam Abdul Najid (alias Abu Dar). Najid's resume includes leadership of Khalifa Islamiyah Mindanao (KIM), which was the organization responsible for the killing of dozens of civilians with an RCIED emplaced outside of a mall in Cagayan de Oro. Abu Dar was seen with Hapilon in an ISIS-PHL planning video recovered by Philippine security forces shortly after the initiation of hostilities in Marawi. Reports indicate that he may have escaped from the conflict zone and Philippine intelligence agents are currently attempting to locate him (see POI).

An integral component necessary for the resurgence of ISIS-PHL is the continued advertising of the ISIS "brand" through print and online media. The central leadership of ISIS once invested heavily in funding and promoting ISIS-PHL (who they refer to as ISIS East-Asia),



BIFF Commanders: Esmael Abdulmalik (leader of JMWA) and Esmael Abubakar Hassan (alias Commander Bungos)



## Special Assessment: The Post-Marawi State of ISIS-Philippines



Planning the Marawi operation. From left to right: Abu Aps/Hafid, Isnilon Hapilon, Humam Abdul Najid, Abdullah Maute

but whether they retain the capacity or appetite to reinvest in rebuilding this franchise remains uncertain. From May to September 2017, the Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium (TRAC) tallied 99 ISIS-PHL attack claims (press releases) published by the ISIS news outlet, *Amaq Media Agency*. That is more than twice the number of claims from any other country or region outside of Iraq and Syria during the same period. Moreover, Inside the Caliphate, a media compilation published by ISIS, highlighted ISIS activities in the Asia Pacific in three out of the four videos in the summer of 2017. Interestingly, on 12 OCT, *Al-Hayat Media Center* released a *nasheed* (a work of vocal music) in English titled “Brothers in Marawi.”

As summer concluded and the prospect for an ISIS-PHL victory in Marawi appeared dim, ISIS media highlights of ISIS-PHL slowed. The *nasheed* was the last significant ISIS media highlight touting the accomplishments of the extremists in Marawi. It also came four days before the death of Hapilon and five days before the fall of Raqqa, the former geographical capital of the caliphate and home to the

media branch.

Of particular note, coalition operations to expel ISIS from Raqqa correspond to a decrease in the quality and quantity of ISIS media outputs. For instance, October 2017 was the first month ISIS failed to publish an issue of their magazine *Rumiyah* since September 2016. Presently, even if there existed a desire to assist with the reconstitution of ISIS-PHL, ISIS core will likely be far too preoccupied with their own survival.

There will likely be a significant decrease in ISIS-aligned VEO operational activity in the Philippines, as they attempt to regroup and reconstitute their forces following the attrition they suffered in Marawi. The recent actions undertaken by Ansar Khalifa Philippines (AKP) evidence this assertion. This group, which operates under the ISIS-PHL banner, entered a period of dormancy following the death of the organization's leadership in early 2017. However, recent AKP activities demonstrate that the group is attempting to grow its force through increased recruitment efforts.

In his outgoing speech, Chief of Staff of the AFP General Eduardo Año, announced on 21 OCT that the next focus areas of the AFP's military campaign will include Sulu-based ASG that is under the leadership of Radullon Sahiron; Basilan-based ASG led by Furuji Indama; and the BIFF faction under Commander Bungos. Underlying this strategic approach are the AFP's efforts to deny ISIS-PHL historical safe heavens, which will further degrade the organization.

As mentioned in “After Marawi” (see **June 2017 Monthly**), it is equally important for the Philippine government to deliver on the previously negotiated 2014 MILF peace deal (Comprehensive Agreement on Bangsamoro), as well as to commit to the rapid rehabilitation of Marawi. Nonetheless, the Philippine government will face significant challenges. First, MILF leadership continues to report growing discontent within their ranks as the peace agreement continues to languish and has not seen substantial progress in over a year. Second, the Philippine government's unimpressive history of administration of humanitarian aid and disaster relief is not encouraging. Estimates for the costs and time necessary for the rehabilitation of the city vary; however, the widespread destruction will require the implementation of an extensive and closely monitored restoration program. To date, the Philippine government has received donations from numerous countries, to include \$15 million USD from the United States, for the immediate restoration of basic public services such as water and electricity. ISIS-PHL has capitalized on the government's missteps and has incorporated these issues as a primary element of their messaging. Failure by the Philippine government to address these pressing requirements will indirectly serve to enhance ISIS-PHL's strategic narrative and to provide a strong impetus for recruitment thus, incidentally facilitating the organization's resurgence.



Top: Marawi, 2010  
Bottom: Marawi, 2017

Sources: PhilStar (5/29/17) Rappler (6/15/17) Understanding Conflict (7/21/17) BenarNews (9/29/17) RSIS (10/17) Rappler (10/15/17) NYT (10/23/17) Stratfor (10/26/17) IBTimes (10/30/17) Rappler (11/6/17)

# Person of Interest / VEO of Interest

<b>POI: Humam Abdul Najid</b>		
<b>ALIAS:</b> Abu Dar; Owayda Marombsar; Owayda Abdul Najid; Wai <b>DOB:</b> 25 JUN 1980 <b>TITLE:</b> Ustadz <b>FROM:</b> Philippines <b>AREA OF OPERATIONS:</b> Marawi, Davao City <b>AFFILIATIONS:</b> Khilafah Islammiyah Mindanao (KIM), Maute Group, ISIS-P		
<p>Humam Abdul Najid is a co-founder and leader of the Mindanao-based insurgent group, Khilafah Islammiyah Mindanao (KIM). Najid, an Afghan-trained Islamic Cleric, reportedly co-founded KIM in 2012 with five other individuals, possibly including Abdullah and Omar Maute. Najid's followers refer to him as the "al-Zarqawi of the Philippines." As of late-October 2017, Najid is thought to be actively recruiting on behalf of ISIS in the Lanao del Sur Province of the Southern Philippines. Authorities believe Najid is using social media to target youth with videos and images highlighting the successes achieved during the Marawi conflict.</p> <p>KIM, one of the leading forces behind the "Black Flag Movement" in the Philippines, was one of the largest (of the minor) insurgent groups. KIM has been involved in numerous attacks in Mindanao. For example, they conducted the September 2013 IED attacks against cinemas in Davao City using devices with batteries inside soda cans that injured at least six civilians. In 2016, the organization joined with the Maute brothers. Following this association, the group incorporated elements of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), and Jemaah Islamiya (JI) networks. In May 2017, KIM fought alongside the Maute group and other ISIS-inspired insurgents in the Marawi conflict.</p> <p>The death of key insurgent leadership during the 2017 Marawi conflict likely caused major confusion among the loosely aligned, smaller militant groups pledging allegiance to ISIS-Philippines (ISIS-PHL). If ISIS-Core appointed a new Southeast Asia (SEA) Emir, it would indicate ISIS still considers SEA a priority in their pursuit of a regional caliphate, which would also likely reduce uncertainty among some Philippine militant groups. However, it is too early to know if a new Emir would be enough for groups like KIM to effectively reconstitute themselves under a unified ISIS flag in the Philippines. Even with a new Emir, the significant loss of ISIS-PHL fighters and leadership will degrade militant organizations' operational capabilities.</p>		
<b>Sources:</b> PhilStar (5/29/17) WordPress IAG (7/22/15) Sd-Mag (10/13/15) Outpost (5/29/17) Kahimyang (6/7/17) PressReader (6/8/17) Inquirer (10/29/17) UNTV (11/6/17)		
<b>VEO: Ma Ba Tha</b>		
<b>AREA OF OPERATIONS:</b> Burma <b>LEADER:</b> Ashin Wirathu <b>ALIAS:</b> 969 Movement, Buddha Dhamma Philanthropy Foundation <b>ASSOCIATED ORGANIZATION:</b> Bodu Bala Sena (Sri Lanka, see June 2017 VEO)		
<p>Formed in 2014 after the Burmese government banned its predecessor organization, the Ma Ba Tha ("Organization for the Protection of Nationalism and Religion") promotes Buddhist Nationalism in Burma. Ashin Wirathu leads the Ma Ba Tha (previously the "969 Movement"). Wirathu is a charismatic monk with a large following of monastic, lay, and online supporters. Though the Burmese government initially took a rather supportive stance on the group, they have made two attempts to limit the power and reach of Wirathu's ideologies since 2013. These attempts, pushed forth by the government appointed Buddhist regulatory agency (State Sangha Maha Nayaka Committee), prohibited the use of certain symbols and limited the organization of monks around nationalist ideologies. Wirathu and his followers have continued their activities, however, by simply re-branding their organization and changing the name.</p>		
<p>Similar to other religious-political movements in SEA, Ma Ba Tha attempts to influence the larger political environment through direct and indirect influence. Examples of direct influence include rallies, posters, calls to action, and the formation of a political wing ("135 United Patriots"). Indirect influence likely consists of swaying the voting population toward parties that promote ultra-nationalist agendas. One of the primary ways that Wirathu has been able to galvanize supporters is by capitalizing on pre-existing anti-Muslim sentiment. Long-standing fears of a Muslim takeover of the country (only 4% of the population currently), to include inter-marrying of Buddhists and Muslims, have become the basis of Wirathu's platform. Recent actions by the Rohingya insurgent group, ARSA, have provided ultra-nationalist elements with new fodder to promote ultra-nationalist agendas and to support further violence against Rohingya civilians.</p>		
<b>Sources:</b> Reuters (6/26/13) Irrawaddy (9/10/13) BBC (10/8/15) RFA (7/13/16) Diplomat (7/20/16) RFA (5/23/17) NYT (5/26/17) Straits Times (5/28/17) Irrawaddy (5/29/17) Asia Times (6/9/17) Atlantic (9/6/17)		

Wirathu marching in Mandalay in 2015

# South Asia: October Significant Activity

## Bangladesh

In October, four senior leaders and trainers of Neo-JMB suicide squads were identified in the media as Samshu, Rashed, Safiq and Salma. All four are currently being sought by authorities. Police stated that they first learned about the four in March 2017, and continually built a case against them throughout the year. They had connections with many of the suicide vest detonations and recoveries, having been identified repeatedly by captured militants. **Dhaka Tribune (10/21/17)**

In the month of October, Bangladeshi Security Forces arrested militants from several different groups: at least 12 militants from Neo-JMB, five from Ansar al-Islam (alias Ansarullah Bangla Team, ABT), 10 from Jamaat-e-Islami (Jel), and 21 from Islami Chhatra Shibir (ICS). Additionally, two members of Islamic State - Bangladesh (IS-B) were also re-arrested in Bangladesh after serving jail time in Singapore for financing terrorism and plotting against the Government of Bangladesh along with two other suspected militants. **Channel News Asia (10/10/17) Daily Star (10/16/17) Straits Times (10/29/17)**

## India

On 5 OCT, following a trend of unintentional firework explosions, the Delhi High Court directed the Delhi police to ensure that the Explosives Act of 1884 and Explosives rules of 2008 is being strictly adhered to in the National Capital region. The Explosives Act of 1884 and Explosives rules of 2008 aim to protect people and structures from unintentional blasts by requiring safer storage and standoff distances. Fireworks accidents have claimed dozens of lives in India over the past few years, such as the explosion at a Madhya Pradesh fireworks factory in June 2017 that killed 25. **al-Jazeera (6/8/17) Daily New and Analysis (10/5/17)**

On 12 OCT, media reported that “poor quality power banks” were found at security checkpoints throughout multiple airports in India. Local authorities reported that most of the device owners had bought their power banks from flea markets, where sellers allegedly offered low prices for false power banks. Intermittent power failures could allow threats to security to go unnoticed as equipment loses power. **Hindustan Times (10/12/17)**

On 25 OCT, media reported that two suspected ISIS operatives, identified as Kasim Stimberwala and Ubed Baig Mirza, were arrested in Surat by the Gujarat Anti-Terrorism Squad (ATS). The operatives were allegedly planning an attack against a synagogue in Ahmedabad during the Gujarat election. Following this report, ATS reported that they were on the lookout for six radicalized youths who they believe could carry out the attack on the synagogue. **India (10/25/17) Daily News and Analysis (10/28/17)**

## Maldives


On 19 OCT, Maldivian authorities received two inmates transferred from Turkish security forces. The Maldivians were attempting to cross from Turkey into Syria to join the war when they were originally apprehended. There have been several previous reports of Maldivians caught along the border area in recent years; in previous cases, Maldivian authorities charged the militants with terrorism and related offenses, though convicting suspected militants has proven more difficult. **The Sun (10/21/17) Maldives Independent (10/21/17) Maldives Independent (10/23/17)**

## Nepal

The Government of Nepal made moves to prepare for the November election, to include the dissolution of the Parliament on 14 OCT. Actions to maintain the Rule of Law and Constitutional reforms have thus far been upheld, and IED violence dropped to zero for the first time since August 2016. Continuous low-level violence is likely attributable to objections to the Constitution ratified in 2015. Kathmandu has taken steps and measures to attempt to reduce political violence in recent months; moves to improve relations with ethnic minority groups and the determination to follow the rules set forth by the Constitution in terms of voting and transparency have greatly benefitted and brought legitimacy to the Government.



# Bangladesh: October IED Events




There was one IED detonation event, two found and cleared IED events, and three IED cache events.

On 5 OCT, police recovered an IED cache from a shop used as a Neo-JMB hideout in Chandrakona Bazar, Nakla, Sherpur, Mymensingh. The cache contained 18 containers of hydrogen peroxide. On 22 OCT, police arrested the militant that rented the shop. **Daily Star (10/7/17) Dhaka Tribune (10/23/17)**

On 9 OCT, security forces found and cleared three PBIEDs during 'Operation Melted Ice' in Ghop Nawapara, Jessore, Khulna, and detained one Neo-JMB militant. The operation targeted the sister of deceased Neo-JMB militant Marjan. EOD conducted a controlled detonation of the devices that reportedly incorporated TATP. **Dhaka Tribune (10/9/17) Daily Star (10/10/17)**

On 23 OCT, security forces recovered an IED cache following a raid on the residence of a Neo-JMB regional organizer in Pagladaha, Sadar, Jessore; they detained one militant. The cache contained 30 grenades, 50 switches, 25 pieces of gel explosives, 150 detonators, 10 liters chemicals, 5kg acid, half a kilogram of nails, ammunition, and other items. **Prothom Alo (10/23/17) BDNews24 (10/24/17)**


Past Year IED Events by Type



On 29 OCT, Rapid Action Battalion recovered an IED cache following a raid on a Neo-JMB meeting at a mango plantation; they detained three militants. The cache contained 1.1kg of explosive powder, one semi-automatic pistol, three rounds of ammunition, one magazine, and jihadist books. **First Post (10/29/17) Dhaka Tribune (10/29/17)**

On 29 OCT, Dhaka Metropolitan Police responded to a crude bomb detonation in Moghbazar, Dhaka; they detained six suspects and recovered several Molotov cocktails from the area. **Daily Star (10/29/17) Dhaka Tribune (10/29/17)**

Past Year IED Event Casualty Count




In October, IED events remained low, with the majority of events being a result of raids on Neo-JMB hideouts. Significant finds of chemicals used in the production of TATP indicate that Neo-JMB is still dedicated to producing the explosive. Authorities have found TATP suicide vests and precursor chemicals several times over recent months.

In addition to raiding Neo-JMB hideouts, security forces targeted Marjan's sister, Khazida, for capture. She is deeply connected in Neo-JMB, with roots at the highest levels of leadership. Her husband, Hadisur Rahman Sagor, is a Neo-JMB arms and explosives supplier wanted for the Holey Artisan bakery attack in July 2016. He fled from the hideout just two days before the 9 OCT raid began.

In upcoming months, it is highly likely that Bangladeshi security forces will continue to pursue militants from Neo-JMB and other groups. The established cycle of arrests and information gathering leading to raids will likely continue well into 2018.

*IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.*

# India: October IED Events



There were 12 IED detonation events, six IED found and cleared events, 13 IED cache events and two hoax IED events.


On 4 OCT, Indian Army personnel recovered an IED cache after noticing suspicious movement at Akhnoor market, Jammu, Jammu and Kashmir. The cache contained one IED, two mines, a USSR-era map of Jammu and Kashmir, fake security badges, and other unspecified items. **Indian Express (10/5/17) TNIE (10/05/17)**

On 13 OCT, police recovered an IED cache from Bimal Gurung supporters at a riverbed near the tea estates of Tukvar, Darjeeling, West Bengal. The police were in the area to conduct a raid against Bimal Gurung supporters, but were ambushed by the group; they were hiding in the riverbed. The ambush killed one officer with small arms fire. The cache contained 20 gelatin sticks, 1000 detonators, small arms weapons and ammunition, and other equipment to facilitate operations. **New Indian Express (10/13/17) One India (10/14/17)**


On 13 OCT, Kalimpong police recovered an IED cache during a raid against a family that was allegedly amassing weapons in Sakyong, Pedong, Darjeeling, West Bengal; police detained two. The cache was recovered at two locations, the homes of Suman Chhettri and his uncle Buddha Rai. The cache included 22 pieces of 400mm powergel explosives, 22 pieces of small 125mm powergel explosives, 60 electrical detonators, unfinished pipe bombs, and several conventional weapons. **Web India 123 (10/13/17) One India (10/14/17)**

On 13 OCT, East Garo Hills police recovered an IED cache following the arrest of two people suspected of supplying the Garo National Liberation Army (GNLA) in Jankegre, Williamnagar, East Garo Hills, Meghalaya. Following interrogation, the two detainees revealed the location of an IED cache. The cache included two "claymore boxes." **Business Standard (10/13/14)**

Past Year IED Events by Type



Past Year IED Event Casualty Count



Overall IED activity remained relatively low in October, though Maoist activity continued to increase as their area of operations recovers from Monsoon flooding. There were a number of incidents in early October, but they tapered off during and after the Diwali holiday season. Darjeeling IED attacks ceased entirely, apparently due to pressure from police targeting Bimal Gurung's resources. While Gurung and his network appear to remain active, it seems unlikely they will be able to conduct attacks at their previous rate of activity, if at all.

Another ISIS plot was disrupted, targeting a synagogue in Ahmedabad, Gujarat. The profile appears to fit the typical Indian ISIS plot at this point, with middle-class Muslims being radicalized over the internet and using locally-available resources and training to carry out the attack. Notably, the two operatives were in contact with Shafi Armar, the Indian Mujahideen-turned-ISIS recruiter, who allegedly died as part of a suicide attack earlier this year. Details on the timing of the communications haven't been released, so it's unclear if this incident implies Armar is alive. As ISIS events happen in the region, it is becoming increasingly apparent India is not a priority for the group, and that a Marawi-scale incident appears unlikely in the near-term.

The mines found in a Jammu and Kashmir IED cache are interesting because the Indian Army frequently experiences casualties from "drifted mine" detonations along patrol routes (mines that have been washed out of place). This find raises the possibility not all mine incidents are from drift, and some may be masked militant activity.

IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

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# Southeast Asia: October Significant Activity

## Southeast Asia

On 23 OCT, the Defense Minister of Indonesia proposed the creation of a “mini-Interpol” that would involve six Southeast Asian countries sharing intelligence through the “Our Eyes” initiative. Defense Minister Ryamizard Ryacudu proposed the plan at the 11th ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM) in the Philippines. The six countries are Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Brunei Darussalam, Singapore, and the Philippines. Under Our Eyes, each participating country would create a new unit for sharing intelligence between them, while the person in charge from each country would be expected to maintain communications on a regular basis about the collection of information. Multilateral intelligence sharing is not common in Southeast Asia as most countries prefer to exchange information bilaterally. **Strait Times (10/24/17) Channel News Asia (10/12/17)**

## Philippines

As of 19 OCT, over 600 NPA rebels have been neutralized (killed, arrested and/or surrendered), and the military announced it wants to wipe out the NPA by 2018. Formal peace talks ended in February of this year due to unprovoked attacks against civilian and military targets; since then the AFP has recorded almost 250 incidents of NPA activity. The Commanding General of the Philippine Army says the NPA is the military’s primary target once Marawi operations wrap up. He said the government is more than willing to resume the stalled peace negotiations, but only if the rebels also reciprocate the same willingness. **Visayan Daily Star (10/11/17) Rappler (10/19/17) Philippine News Agency (10/22/17)**

The widow of Mohammad Jaafar Maguid (alias Tokboy), the slain leader of Ansar al-Khilafah Philippines (AKP), a black flag group based in southern Philippines, was taken into custody on suspicion of serving as a top online recruiter for ISIS. Karen Aizha Hamidon is being held by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Tokboy, who was proficient at social media, had known connections to ISIS fighters in the Middle East, though it is not known if he shared those contacts with Hamidon. Last year, she recruited Indian nationals to join militants in the south. Hamidon, who uses the name “Aisha” on her accounts, used social media platforms to recruit and encourage young Muslim sympathizers to join militants in Marawi. **Benar News (10/18/17)**

## Thailand

In order to assist in tackling the unrest in the southern provinces the Deputy Defense Minister allocated 13.2 billion baht (USD 397 million) for the next fiscal year to the armed forces. Included in this allotment is a budget to develop and implement an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) program designed to conduct reconnaissance on southern insurgents. It is unclear what type of UAVs will be purchased; however, the plan is to acquire four platforms to survey 37 districts in the southern border region. During 2016, small UAVs were used to monitor railway tracks, but they were largely ineffective. Skeptics have raised concerns over the value of using UAVs to track an organization and individuals that can hide in plain sight. **Benarnews (10/20/17)**

## Burma


Thousands of landmines, IEDs, and explosives litter the landscape of Burma’s nine states. The chairman for a civilian organization interested in working to clear explosive hazards, the Humanitarian Mine Action Initiative, told media that seven or so groups want to assist the government by conducting clearing operations, but they have not yet been given permission. The government has typically taken a more reactive versus proactive stance on explosive events, providing compensation and medical care to victims. Burma’s Social Welfare Department received a budget of K20 million (USD 14,700) to help 100 victims this fiscal year, and the budget is expected to expand to cover twice as many victims next fiscal year. **Eleven (10/21/17) Eleven (10/22/17) Eleven (10/21/17)**

## Singapore

On 17 OCT, Singaporean held the first phase of their 10th Northstar counterterrorism exercise at the Changi Airport. The exercise kicked off with five gunmen and a suicide bomber storming the Changi Airport MRT station and Terminal 3, shooting commuters and detonating an IED. The operation involved 650 personnel from various agencies, including the Singapore Civil Defense Force, Singapore Armed Forces, and Changi Airport Group. The second phase, held on 28 OCT, simulated VBIED attacks in crowded areas, such as a shopping mall and bus interchange. It involved 500 personnel from 10 agencies and tested the ability of their first responders to navigate through debris and collapsed ceilings to pull victims to safety while national water and energy agencies worked to restore energy and water supply. **Singaporean Government (10/29/17) The NewPaper (10/19/17)**



# Philippines: October IED Events



There were five IED detonation events, one IED found and cleared event, and eight IED cache events.


On 3 OCT, an IED detonation caused National Grid Corporation of the Philippines' Tower 106 to topple, resulting in six hours of power outages in Purok 1, Manarapan, Carmen, North Cotabato, SOCCSKSARGEN, Mindanao. The IEDs were strapped to the columns of the steel tower which were rigged to be detonated remotely. **Philippine Star (10/3/17)**

On 6 OCT, an IED planted by New People's Army (NPA) rebels near a military vehicle detonated causing injuries to six soldiers and one civilian in Pangilihan, Janiway, Iloilo, Western Visayas, Panay. Following the detonation, a brief firefight ensued between rebels and troops. Electrical wiring measuring 100 meters used to trigger the device was recovered from the blast site. **ABS-CBN News (10/7/17)**  
**GMA Network (10/7/17)**


On 17 OCT, security forces recovered a cache following a joint operation against BIFF in Datu Salibo, Maguindano, Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), Mindanao, resulting in one detained. The cache contained bomb making components, one fragmentation grenade and illegal drugs. The detained suspect is believed to be a student of Malaysian bomb expert Zulkifli bin Hir and also part of a BIFF squad which targets soldiers along Maguindanao highways. **Inquirer Mindanao (10/18/17)**

On 29 OCT, joint army and police forces recovered a cache after serving six search warrants to NPA members in San Luis, Agusan del Sur, Caraga, Mindanao, resulting in six detained. The cache contained four IEDs, two fragmentation grenades, four blasting caps, two detonating cords, and assorted firearms. **Manila Bulletin (10/29/17)**

Past Year IED Events by Type



Past Year IED Event Casualty Count



This month, IED activity remained roughly consistent from last month, with most events being cache recoveries. The NPA conducting their typical attacks against government troops and harassment of civilians this month. Troops recovered a few caches from BIFF as well. In October, there was one event attributed to the ASG: troops arrested a member with one IED in his possession who is said to be a spotter that identifies potential kidnap victims. ASG members continue to surrender to troops this month; over 100 bandits have surrendered since the beginning of the year.

On 17 OCT, President Duterte officially announced that Marawi had been liberated from ISIS-PHL militants following a five-month standoff (**see Special Assessment**). As troops begin pulling out, it is estimated to cost over \$1 billion to rebuild the city and will take the military an undetermined amount of time to clear the city of any remaining terrorists and explosives.

IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

# Thailand: October IED Events



There were four IED detonation events and one IED cache event.

On 5 OCT, the 43<sup>rd</sup> Ranger Task Force recovered an IED cache at a residence in Yarang, Pattani, following inputs from a suspect detained on 2 OCT. The cache contained unidentified chemicals, fertilizers, and cut pieces of iron resembling shrapnel commonly used in IEDs by the southern Thai insurgents. **The Nation (10/5/17)**

On 9 OCT, an RCIED detonated against a paramilitary patrol in Bacho, Narathiwat, killing one soldier and wounding another. The IED was buried roadside; separatists initiated the device by two way radio as the patrol passed. The entire device, contained in a gas cylinder, weighed an estimated 20kg. **Bangkok Post (10/9/17) Bernama (10/9/17)**


On 16 OCT, separatists detonated an IED during a complex attack near a checkpoint in Tak Bai, Narathiwat. The militants targeted the checkpoint with small arms to lure security forces within the blast range of the 20-25kg IED that was concealed along the road leading up to the checkpoint. **Bangkok Post (10/16/17)**

On 19 OCT, an RCIED detonated against a defense volunteer patrol in Sungai Padi, Narathiwat. Separatists initiated the 20kg gas cylinder IED by two-way radio. **Bangkok Post (10/19/17) The Nation (10/19/17)**

On 19 OCT, a thrown IED detonated against a defense security building in Chanae, Narathiwat. The PVC pipe IED weighed 700g, and detonated on impact. **Bangkok Post (10/19/17)**


October IED activity was slightly lower than the previous month, with much of the country commemorating the one year anniversary of the King's death. Bucking historical trends related to the 2004 Tak Bai incident, during which 85 southern Thai protestors were killed, the Royal Thai Army (RTA) and the Royal Thai Police (RTP) reported no commemorative IED attacks by the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN).

Despite October drawing to a close, it is still possible insurgents will conduct a large-scale commemorative attack in early November. During a large scale, commemorative event on 2-3 NOV 2016, insurgents conducted 19 attacks over two days.



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# Burma: October IED Events




There was one IED cache event.

On 29 OCT, security forces recovered an IED cache under a bridge in Myo-U, Maungdaw, Rakhine. The cache contained 40 PVC pipe bombs, measuring six inches long by one inch wide. **Eleven Myanmar (10/29/17) Global New Light of Myanmar (10/30/17)**

IED activity continued to drop in October, reaching the lowest level since April. Violence in Rakhine state has largely quieted down over the last month, though communities in the area are still reeling from the conflict. Much of the Rohingya population has fled across the border into Bangladesh over the past two months, leaving entire villages abandoned. In the coming months, it is likely that moves will be made to repatriate some of the internally displaced persons and refugees that have fled fighting; however, Burmese government officials may resist demands by Bangladesh that they take back all 600,000 refugees. Concurrently, it is possible that militants will re-group on the Bangladesh side of the border and attack again, despite CT efforts by Bangladeshi security forces.

Past Year IED Events by Type




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
[Return to first page](#)



# Malaysia: October IED Events



Past Year IED Events by Type



There was one IED cache event.

On 10 OCT, police recovered an IED cache in Pasir Puteh, Kelantan in conjunction with the arrest of three unidentified Malaysian terrorists who were plotting to carry out attacks throughout Klang Valley. The targeted locations included the Better Beer Festival, entertainment venues, and places of worship. The cache contained six PVC pipes, eight AA batteries, firecrackers, fireworks, 12 boxes of matches, red and white wires, six bottles filled with gas, precision tools, two mobile phones, and four IEDs. Three of the IEDs were described as 5.5 cm in diameter and 13 cm long, and that they contained explosives and ball bearings. A fourth IED was described as a "gas pipe" IED, 4 cm in diameter and 15 cm long. **Malaysian Digest (10/17/17) Star (10/17/17) (10/19/17)**

IED activity for the month of October remained consistently low for the third month in a row. While the names of the three individuals were withheld from the media, police mentioned that the attack involved a 19-year-old student, a 35-year-old former Malaysian Army soldier, and a 25-year-old construction contractor who was linked to the Gangak Hitam gang that was involved in the 2016 grenade attack in Puchong (**see Incident Highlight**). The involvement of a former Malaysian soldier in a terror plot is somewhat concerning, but not unanticipated. Malaysia is aware that this phenomenon follows a trend. In 2015, the Deputy Defense Minister revealed to the Malaysian parliament that 70 army personnel were found to be involved with ISIS. Malaysian military and police personnel are often targeted for recruitment by VEOs such as ISIS for their expertise in combat and weapons.

# Northeast Asia: October Significant Activity

## China

On 19 OCT, the Chinese Embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan requested increased security due to a threat received from East Turkministan Islamic Movement (ETIM) militants. ETIM is a Xinjiang, China-based militant organization that is a designated terrorist organization allied with al-Qa'ida. According to media, the threat was made against both the Chinese Ambassador, Yao Jing, and Chinese workers in Pakistan. There have been terrorism incidents in recent months targeting Chinese workers in Pakistan, such as the kidnapping and murder of two Chinese workers by ISIS in Balochistan, Pakistan in May 2017. **Economic Times (10/23/17) Hindustan Times (10/31/17)**

In October, reporting indicated a number of concerning human rights issues in Xinjiang connected to the crackdown on Uyghur Muslims. Starting in April, Chinese authorities have engaged the detention of hundreds of civilians in the region accused of political dissent, often sentencing them to re-education camps or prison without trial. According to officials in Hotan's Qaraqash county, authorities were ordered to send 40% of the population to re-education camps. High-profile arrests of artists and musicians have also occurred, including the arrest of popular musician Abdurehim Heyit for lyrics authorities claim support jihad and Uyghur identity. Moves have also been made to target Uyghurs and ethnic Kazakhs who criticize the Chinese Communist Party, have overseas contacts, or are caught praying or wearing "Islamic" clothing. This recent crackdown over the last six months follows on a travel ban, passport confiscation drive, and other infringements of basic human rights in the region over the last two years. **RFA (10/31/17) Freemuse (11/1/17) RFA (11/1/17)**

# IED Calendar

The IED calendar was established to help our audience maintain awareness of events, such as anniversaries of major attacks, or political, religious or cultural events that often coincide (or can potentially coincide) with a spike in IED events.

	S	M	T	W	T	F	S
<b>21 SEP-19 OCT (WW):</b> Al-Hijrah Islamic New Year  <b>1 OCT 2005 (INDO):</b> Bali attack anniversary  <b>25 OCT 2004 (THA):</b> Tak Bai Incident  <b>21 NOV 2006 (NEP):</b> Signing of the Comprehensive Peace Accord ending the civil war  <b>23 NOV 2009 (PHL):</b> Maguindanao Massacre  <b>26 NOV (NEP):</b> Provincial Elections  <b>26 NOV 2008 (IND):</b> Mumbai attack  <b>6 DEC 1992 (IND):</b> Babri Masjid Mosque Destruction  <b>14 DEC (IND):</b> ULFA Revenge Day  <b>16 DEC (BNG):</b> Victory Day  <b>22 DEC (IND):</b> CPI-M Military Wing Anniversary  <b>25 DEC (IND):</b> Christmas Attack Anniversary	1 INDO WW	2 WW	3 WW	4 WW	5 WW	6 WW	7 WW
	8 WW	9 WW	10 WW	11 WW	12 WW	13 WW	14 WW
	15 WW	16 WW	17 WW	18 WW	19 WW	20	21
	22	23	24	25 THA	26	27	28
	29	30	31	1	2	3	4
<b>November 2017</b>	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
	19	20	21 NEP	22	23 PHL	24	25
	26 NEP IND	27	28	29	30	1	2
<b>December 2017</b>	3	4	5	6 IND	7	8	9
	10	11	12	13	14 IND	15	16 BNG
	17	18	19	20	21	22 IND	23
	24	25 IND	26	27	28	29	30
	31	1	2	3	4	5	6

IND – India  
 NEP – Nepal  
 THA – Thailand  
 BNG – Bangladesh  
 PHL – Philippines  
 WW – Worldwide



# Common Terms and Acronyms

AN – Ammonium Nitrate  
 ANFO – Ammonium Nitrate Fuel Oil  
 ARMM – Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao  
 CIV – Civilian  
 CBRN – Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear  
 COIN – Counter-insurgency  
 CWIED – Command Wire IED  
 DTMF – Dual-Tone Multi-Frequency  
 EFP – Explosively Formed Projectile  
 EOD – Explosive Ordnance Disposal  
 F/C – Found & Cleared  
 HME – Homemade Explosives  
 HN – Host Nation (Police, Military, Government)  
 IDF – Indirect Fire  
 IDP – Internally Displaced Persons  
 IED – Improvised Explosive Device  
 KFR – Kidnap for Ransom  
 KIA – Killed in Action  
 LOC – Line of Communication  
 LPG – Liquefied Petroleum Gas  
 MSR – Main Supply Routes  
 NFI – No Further Information  
 NSTR – Nothing Significant To Report  
 PBA – Post Blast Analysis  
 PBIED – Personnel Borne (Suicide Bomb) IED

PCB – Printed Circuit Board  
 PN – Partner Nation  
 PPIED – Pressure Plate IED  
 QRF – Quick Response Force  
 RCIED – Radio Controlled IED  
 RCP – Route Clearance Patrols  
 RPG – Rocket Propelled Grenade  
 SA – South Asia  
 SAF – Small Arms Fire  
 SEA – Southeast Asia  
 SVBIED – Suicide Vehicle Borne IED  
 TATP – Triacetone Triperoxide  
 TNT – Trinitrotoluene (C<sub>7</sub>H<sub>5</sub>N<sub>3</sub>O<sub>6</sub>)  
 TTP – Tactics, Techniques and Procedures  
 UXO – Unexploded Ordnance  
 VBIED – Vehicle Borne IED  
 VEO – Violent Extremist Organization  
 VOIED – Victim Operated IED  
 WIA – Wounded in Action

# Governments, Groups and Organizations

ASG – Abu Sayyaf Group  
 BIFF – Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters  
 BIPP – Barisan Islam Perberbasan Patani  
 BRN-C – Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate  
 BSF – Border Security Forces  
 BNP – Bangladesh National Party  
 BriMob – Mobile Brigade (Indonesia CT Forces)  
 CPI-M – Communist Party of India (Maoist)  
 CPN-M – Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)  
 CPP – Communist Party of the Philippines  
 CRPF – Central Reserve Police Force (India)  
 GMIP – Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Patani  
 HM – Hizb-ul-Mujahideen  
 HNLC – Hynniewtre National Liberation Council (India)  
 HUJI-B – Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami Bangladesh  
 IB – India's Intelligence Bureau  
 IM – Indian Mujahideen  
 IrW – Irregular Warfare  
 ISI – Inter-Services Intelligence (Pakistan)  
 ISIS – Islamic State of Iraq ash Sham  
 JAT – Jemaah Ansharout Tauhid  
 JI – Jemaah Islamiya  
 JTMM – Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha  
 JIB – Jemaat-e-Islami Bangladesh  
 JeM – Jaish-e-Mohammed

JMB – Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh  
 JMJB – Jama'atul Muslim Janta Bangladesh  
 KIA – Kachin Independence Army  
 KIM – Khalifa Islamiya Mindanao  
 KIO – Kachin Independence Organization  
 LeT – Lashkar-e Tayyiba  
 MILF – Moro Islamic Liberation Front  
 MILF-SOG – MILF-Special Operations Group  
 MNLF – Moro National Liberation Front  
 NPA – New People's Army  
 PNP – Philippine National Police  
 POLRI – Indonesian National Police  
 PULO – Patani United Liberation Organization  
 RAB – Rapid Action Battalion (Bangladesh)  
 RKK – Runda Kumpulan Kecil  
 SJMM – Samyukta Jatiya Mukti Morcha  
 SJTMM – Samyukta Jana Tantrik Terai Mukti Morcha  
 ULFA – United Liberation Front of Assam  
 UWSA – United Wa State Army  
 YCL – Youth Communist League